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The War of 1812 can be a puzzling historical event for scholars to study. Its monikers
have included both “the forgotten war” as well as the “Revolutionary War Part II.” Donald
Hickey argued that “the average American is only vaguely aware of who our enemy was in the
War of 1812 or why we fought.”1 One of the most confusing aspects of the war continues to be
what precisely caused the United States to ultimately declare war on Great Britain. A consensus
has yet to be unequivocally reached with some historians citing maritime conflicts as the cause,
while others blamed emerging nationalism some blame nefarious intentions and manifest
destiny, while others prefer an explanation that involves parts of every theory combined.
Coincidentally, a pattern emerges when we examine the historiography of this topic. At the start
of the examination of the causes of the war by various scholars, many were quick to blame
obvious maritime conflicts as the cause of the war. Those next generation of historians that
followed sought to paint a larger picture by examining evidence related to economics,
expansionism, as well as ways the political landscape at the time could have paved the road to
war. This work will attempt to briefly analyze the research that currently exists on the causes of
The War of 1812, as well as to explain the shift in the historiography concerning those causes.
While the literature on the War of 1812 and its causes are vast, for the purposes of this thesis, I
have chosen to focus on a limited stable of historians.
Chapter 1, entitled “Early Interpretations: Maritime Grievances” examines the works of
Alexander James Dallas, Henry Marie Brackenridge, Richard Hildreth, Gilbert Auchinleck, and
Henry Adams. This chapter also examines how President James Madison attempted to control
the narrative of the war before the Treaty of Ghent had even been signed. Chapter 2, entitled
“Changing Interpretations” looks at the works of Theodore Roosevelt, Howard T. Lewis, Julius
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Pratt, George Rodgers Taylor, Warren H. Goodman, and A.L. Burt. The Third Chapter, entitled:
“The Sixties Renews interest” looks at the works of Bradford Perkins, Reginald Horsman, Roger
Brown, Harry Coles, Clifford Egan, J.C.A. Stagg, and Donald Hickey. Chapter 4, entitled
“Bicentennial Anniversary Renews Interest” examines some of the most recent studies on the
War of 1812 by Jeremy Black, Paul Gilje, Noah Feldman, and Richard Maass.
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Chapter 1: Early Interpretations: Maritime Grievances
The first text to emerge concerning the War of 1812 was written by the then current
Secretary of Treasury, Alexander James Dallas. Dallas’s text An Exposition of the Causes and
Character of the War, was in fact mostly written in November and December of 1814 while
diplomats were still discussing the terms of the Treaty of Ghent that eventually ended the war.2
Dallas continued to make changes to his work into early 1815 while some pages had already
begun the production process. This was because the full text from the Treaty did not reach
Washington until February 13, 1815.3 Dallas’ full text was then sent to former President Thomas
Jefferson by the then current President James Madison on March 12, 1815, with a letter
requesting his assistance concerning a decision about the book’s publication.4 Madison wrote
that he had originally hoped that by commissioning an “expose of the causes and character of the
war between the United Stated and Great Britain should remedy the mischief produced by the
declaration of the Prince Regent and other misstatements which had poisoned the opinion of the
world on the subject.”5 What Madison was referencing was a declaration given by the Prince
regent in January 1813, in which he “described the United States as the aggressor in the War.”6
Madison specifically noted a desperate need for the text because the “pacification in Europe”
with the ending of the Napoleonic Wars had caused the “turning [of] attention” towards the
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United States.7 Madison explained to Jefferson that Congress determined a “correct and full
view of the War, should be prepared and made public in the usual Demi official form.”8
Despite every effort made by Dallas, the text had not been finished before terms were
reached in Ghent and Madison had feared the “spirit and language” of the text may be seen as
“unbecoming” and upset the newly found peace.9 His decided on only a few possible solutions.
Either rewrite the text entirely, add a “prefatory notice” making the reader aware that the text had
been written before the details of the treaty emerged, or as Madison pushed, to suppress the work
entirely and burn the few hundred copies that had already been produced. Madison explicitly
noted in his letter to Jefferson that the text either needed to be returned to him or locked away
where there would be “no danger of it escaping.”10 Ever the decisive mentor Jefferson returned
the book, explaining that he had read it with “great pleasure…but with irresistible desire that it
should be published.”11 The decision had been made with the work released to the public
quickly, with a prefatory note, noting what Madison had explained in his letter to Jefferson.
As a Jeffersonian Republican who had been appointed as the U.S. District Attorney for
eastern Pennsylvania in 1801 by then president Thomas Jefferson, and later appointed secretary
of Treasury by President Madison in 1814 one may rightly question Alexander James Dallas
ability to remain unbiased. While keeping this in mind when examining Dallas’ text, it is
obvious that Dallas’ Jeffersonian Republican ideals shaped what he believed to be the causes of
war. Dallas began his work giving a thorough history of the policy of impressment in the
eighteenth century. He wrote that the British believed every one of their subjects “was bound by
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a tie of allegiance to his sovereign, which no lapse of time, no change of place, no exigency of
life, could possibly waken, or dissolve…the British Sovereign was entitled, at all periods, and on
all occasions to the services of his subjects.”12 Dallas explained that in order to “discover and
impress” British subjects who were attempting to escape from their duties, British naval leaders
and their representatives believed they were “lawfully” permitted to forcibly enter and search
American merchant ships. Dallas argued that this practice became somewhat difficult as the
British claimed the “tie of allegiance” between a sovereign and their subject “cannot be severed
or relaxed.”13 Dallas, expressing common sentiment and the time, wrote that United States
citizens were not obligated to “accommodate the British maritime policy” as they had acquired
independence “by the glorious revolution of 1776.”14
While arguing for complete independence from all British maritime policy, Dallas also
brought up the argument of naturalization. If the allegiance between a sovereign and their
subject could never be severed, than what about American citizens who had been naturalized?
Dallas charged the British with violating the “contract of naturalization” as well as the
“reciprocal obligations of allegiance” it created. He concluded that as long as the naturalized
citizen “continued within the territory and jurisdiction of his adoptive government, he cannot be
pursued, or seized, or restrained, by his former sovereign.”15 Dallas asserted that the practice of
naturalization had been a respected practice throughout Europe, however, at this time Great
Britain was claiming “dominion over the seas” through “the coarse and licentious hand of [the]
British press gangs” who had been charged with the task of stopping and searching ships in order
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to discover and impress British subjects.16 Dallas argued that the citizens of the United States,
outraged at the continuance of impressment practices, “with one mind and one voice, called
loudly upon their government, for redress and protection” while the United States sought to
“soothe the exasperated spirit of the people.”17
Dallas continued his explanation of events that he believed led to the War of 1812, with a
relatively short discussion on the Berlin Decree, The Embargo, The Non-Importation Act, The
Milan Decree, and the Orders-In-Council. He concluded that every action taken by the United
States was to obtain “just” and “honorable” agreements from the former motherland, with every
action to “appeal to the justice and magnanimity of Great Britain was now…fruitless and
forlorn” as she “contemptuously disregarded the neutrality of the American territory…usurp[ing]
and exerciz[ing] on the water, a tyranny.”18 According to Dallas, the war was inevitable, and
declared by Congress as they “could pause no longer…under a deep and afflicting sense of
national wrongs.”19
Alexander James Dallas spent the remainder of his text decrying his outrage for the “lies”
the Prince Regent had spread across the world concerning the causes of the declaration of the
War of 1812, and what nation held the blame. He dismissed the war as one for “conquest” by
writing that the instigation of the natives had been conducted by the British, and the “military
occupation of Upper Canada, was, therefore deemed indispensable to the safety of the frontier”
due to the need to “restrain the violence of the enemy.”20 As for the Orders-In-Council being the
cause of the war, with the Prince Regent announcing to the world their repeal days before the
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declaration of war should have appeased the United States government, Dallas asserted it would
have only “been the subject of renewed negotiations” as impressment was announced a
“principal cause” with the only way to obtain peace being the “express abandonment of the
practice.”21 Dallas explained that while the United States “never lost sight of the object of all
just wars, a just peace” they “had no choice but to invigorate war.”22
In the last twenty odd pages of his text Dallas sought to unquestionably explain to the rest
of the world the context of the war that had been fought, what the author described as “solemn
appeal to the rest of the civilized world.”23 Dallas continued to lobby against Britain’s wartime
behavior as a way to demonize British character itself. Dallas wrote about a “striking contrast”
between United States war time policy and the “insidious” policy of war that the British held. He
went on to describe in detail some of the atrocious “war crimes” committed by the British,
including their burning of the villages of Lewiston, Manchester, Tuscarora, Buffalo, and Black
Rock “lay[ing] waste the whole of the Niagara frontier, leveling every house and every hut” in
attempts to again describe how the British had “upset the social order…violated the principles of
social law” by forming an alliance with “savages” and “selecting these auxiliaries in its
hostilities.”24
After examining the content of this text, it becomes glaringly clear why President
Madison was reluctant to publish it, and instead seriously contemplated whether he could destroy
every copy in existence before it reached the press. The Anglophobia was apparent on every
page with Alexander James Dallas clearly hoping to persuade the world that the United States
was forced, both by her citizens cries for help as well as the “unrelenting” “aggressive” policies
21
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that had been adopted by the British government. Mentioned often throughout the text, the
words of the Prince Regent clearly had a large impact on the rest of the world’s perception of the
narrative that surrounded the war. Dallas and the United States Congress, along with President
Madison had completed what they initially intended to with the publication of this exposition, as
impressment being perceived as the main cause for the declaration of the War of 1812 would not
be questioned until the end of the nineteenth century.
In Henry Marie Brackenridge’s History of the Late War, Between the United States and
Great Britain, published in 1817, Brackenridge not only felt that the British policy of
impressment was the main grievance and cause of the war but his accusations about the “ultimate
aim” of the British was even more insidious. Brackenridge was born in 1786, the son of a
prominent Pennsylvanian Judge. His family sent him off at an early age to Louisiana in order to
fulfill family requirements and receive a “proper French” education.25 He later became a judge
and returned to Louisiana in 1811 as a District Attorney General. After the state of Louisiana
was admitted to the union as the eighteenth state in 1812, Brackenridge played a large role in
creating the state’s legal code.26 During the War of 1812, Brackenridge played a vital
“intelligence” role by reporting any events of importance directly to his very close friend,
President James Madison.27 His book on the war was published in 1817.
Impressment, explained Brackenridge, was simply one way that the British were
“attempting to exercise their power without right over her American brethren.”28 Brackenridge
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claimed that Great Britain feared the United States would become “formidable rivals” so they set
out to “eat away” at the “cement of our union” in the hopes of “seeing us divided and engaged in
civil broils.”29 Impressment was seen by Brackenridge as an “odious and almost obsolete”
practice, and while the Orders-In-Council may have caused American merchants “a thousand
vexations,” Brackenridge asserted that the “intolerable outrage” and “universal clamor for war”
from the citizens was directly related to impressment.30 Brackenridge wrote that when
questioned, the British argued that they were “contending for their existence” as the British had
been desperate for men to fill their ships in order to fight back Napoleon’s armies. However,
Brackenridge argued that the United States, a new nation dependent on trade for their growth,
was also fighting for their existence and they “were no more bound to consult [England’s]
interest, than she considered herself bound to consult ours.”31
The incident that occurred between the American ship Chesapeake, and the British ship
Leopard, in which the Leopard fired on the Chesapeake when refused the right to board and
search for British deserters, was the “true” start of the War according to Brackenridge. He
claimed that “although hostilities were not declared, the feelings of America were from that day
at war with England.”32
Brackenridge did also address trade restrictions and native hostilities in his text when he
considered other causes of the War. He claimed that the trade restrictions were simply the
British attempting to again assert her “control” over the United States, angered that we could not
be “kicked into her war” with the French.33 When the British claimed to be “fighting for their
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existence” Brackenridge argued that this was not at all the case. Instead, Brackenridge
concluded “If it had been true, why did she continue, at such a time, to insult and abuse us in
every possible shape?”34 Instead, Brackenridge claimed it had all been a “stupendous scheme”
and the Napoleonic Wars were not a fight for Great Britain’s existence, but “only a contest
between two great nations for the mastery of the world.”35
When it came to the topic of native hostilities, Brackenridge again claimed it was all a
part of a British plot to undermine the United States government. He argued that British
“instigation” could be the only possible reason the native population was upset with the
Americans. While acknowledging that they had been “encroach[ing] upon their hunting
grounds” it had been a “necessary consequence” due to the “increase in our population.”36
Because the United States had “endeavored to obtain them by fair purchase” and “had been the
first to respect [native] territorial rights,” Brackenridge believed there was no possibility that the
Native Americans could be angered by their treatment by the United States (an idea that will be
revisited later in this essay) and therefore the British had to have been to blame.37
In his conclusion, Brackenridge asserts that the War of 1812 was somewhat of an
inevitability, noting that the continuation of impressment practices had forced Congress into a
corner. He referenced a quote from Benjamin Franklin, in which Franklin had rejected the
naming of the Revolutionary War as the “war of independence.”38 Instead, Franklin noted that he
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believed they had only experienced a simple revolution, writing that the “war for independence
is yet to come.”39
In The History of the United States of America: From the Discovery of the Continent to
the Organization of Government Under the Federal Constitution, published in 1852, journalist
and historian Richard Hildreth addressed what he believed to be the causes of the War of 1812.
At one point holding positions at the both the Boston Atlas and the Tribune papers, Hildreth was
best known for his abolitionist writings, and even then his work was for the most part ignored
during his lifetime.40 His History of the United States was almost completely overlooked and
would not be referenced by most historical scholars till the next century.41 The problem with
Hildreth’s work was twofold. First, it was considered extremely biased with many referring to
him as “the federalist historian.”42 Second, Hildreth’s work was considered “frigid” and “dry”
with many concluding that Hildreth had “sacrificed readability to a theory of history.”43 What
made Hildreth’s work notable, however, was the vastly different viewpoint he held as to what
had caused the War of 1812. Rather than accepting impressment as the main cause as other
American historians had at the time, Hildreth sought to lay the blame squarely on then President
Thomas Jefferson.
Hildreth instead blamed an ingrained “feeling [in the United States] of indignant hostility
to England, the still glowing embers of ancient hate having been kindled into flame.”44 Hildreth
continued, arguing that Washington and Adams knew that peace came at a cost, causing them to
39
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make concessions at times which Hildreth wrote was how Jay’s Treaty came about, as well as
the ratification of the convention with Napoleon.45 However when it came to Jefferson, Hildreth
argued that his hate for Great Britain was so “deeply rooted” agreements with the nation felt far
too “utterly abhorrent” for him to even consider, which is what he argued led to his opposition of
the ratification of Jay’s Treaty.46 According to Hildreth, it was also this sentiment that led to
Jefferson’s refusal to consider any of Greenville’s offers on changing (but not eliminating)
impressment on behalf of Great Britain as well as his complete rejection of Monroe’s treaty
without consulting with any members of Congress.47 Hildreth did make sure to clearly explain
that he did not believe Jefferson intentionally acted in any way that he believed would have
caused a war, as this would have been contrary to many of his beliefs, however he believes it was
inadvertently caused by what he criticized as Jefferson’s great “inflexibility” as a President.
While Hildreth’s work was all but ignored at the time it was published, it did show a completely
different viewpoint from other American historians at the time. Later American historians in the
early nineteenth century as well as historians from Canada and England attempted to expand on
the ideas presented by Hildreth.
Gilbert Auchinleck, a Canadian historian, began his 1855 work A History of the War
Between Great Britain and the United States of America During the Years 1812, 1813, and 1814
with an attempt to reassure his reader that he intended to study of the War of 1812 with a fair and
balanced approach. To show his readers his dedication to truthful writing, Auchinleck wrote
“An historical narrative which willfully offends against truth or distorts it against party purposes
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is an imposture…we write, jealously observant of truth.”48 Examining this text, it quickly
becomes clear why Auchinleck prefaced his work with this statement as his interpretations of the
causes of the War of 1812 were completely contrary to what other historians were writing at this
time. According to Auchinleck, the war was ultimately provoked by the French Emperor
Napoleon with his declaration of the Berlin Decree on the 21st of November in 1806.
Auchinleck criticized American politicians and historians for writing the Berlin Decree off,
believing it to be a “dead letter.”49 He instead argued that while “the extinction of British trade
was greatly beyond [Napoleon’s] power” his decree still caused a vast amount of “extremely
severe losses.”50 To support this argument, Auchinleck referenced a payment that English
merchants in the Hans Towns received in the amount eight hundred thousand pounds from the
English government in order to prevent them from becoming completely insolvent, proof of the
severe damages caused by the Berlin Decree.51
Gilbert Auchinleck used this argument to support the British decision to issue the British
Orders in Council on January 7, 1807. He continued, arguing that while many had criticized the
British for this move, they had been incorrect for assuming the Order was the result of a “bias
Tory Ministry,” as the Order was the result of a “Whig Cabinet headed by Mr. Fox” a man
Auchinleck concludes could “hardly be charged with any bias.”52 In his final argument it is clear
that Auchinleck hoped to absolve the British of any blame for the cause of the war, in particular
to divert the blame from the British Orders in Council. For this, Auchinleck turned to James
Monroe who at the time had been serving as the United States minister to Britain. He wrote that
48
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Monroe had expressed “concurrence and satisfaction” with the Orders, confidant that “the spirit
of the Orders was to deprive the French and all nations subject to their control, which had
embraced the Continental system” concluding that it was essentially a “mild and lenient measure
of retaliation” when compared to the much more “violent and extensive character of the Berlin
Decree.”53 Instead Gilbert Auchinleck charged the United States in his text with the crime of
empowering Bonaparte with their “ deplorable silent acquiesce” of the Berlin Decree, a move
that the author boldly argued could have stunted Napoleon’s destruction.54 Instead Auchinleck
blamed the “President of the United States” conspicuously omitting Jefferson’s name, for being
“gentle, plaintive, and supplicatory [towards Napoleon Bonaparte], compared with the strong and
angry language frequently addressed from [the President] to ministers and plenipotentiaries of
Great Britain.”55
When it came to discussing the events of the Chesapeake affair that occurred on June
23rd, 1807, Auchinleck again attempted to absolve the British from any wrongdoing. Instead, the
author asserted that the British ship Leopard attempted a simple enforcement of their legal “right
to search” the frigate Chesapeake and had they simply been allowed to fulfill their right to search
for deserters, the entire situation could have been avoided. Auchinleck instead blamed
Commodore Barron of the Chesapeake for the resulting entanglement that “contributed still
further to agitate the public mind.”56 Again, deliberately omitting Jefferson’s name from the
conversation, Auchinleck charged “the President of the United States” with purposely using
“language calculated to inflame the public mind in a very high degree” making the situation
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“vastly worse.”57 Auchinleck continued to drive home his point, explaining that “the President”
acted hastily when he had ordered the immediate departure of all British ships from all of “the
harbors or waters of the United States” a move he argued was a deliberately “hostile measure.”58
Auchinleck instead commended the British government for their “frank and honorable spirit”
who “before one word of complaint…promptly and spontaneously testify their concern at the
mistaken proceedings of their offer, and their cordial desire to make reparation.”59 What
Auchinleck referred to here was the immediate recall of British, of the Captain of the Leopard
that had fired on the Chesapeake.60
To further show how American policies and actions resulted in the War of 1812,
Auchinleck addressed the impressment problem, an issue he believed to be heavily
mischaracterized by the Americans. While he acknowledged that some Americans may have
been wrongfully impressed he insists it was a problem that only occurred “now and then,” and
was not done with “willful disregard of ascertained origin.”61 He again took aim in his text at
“the President” whom he charged repeatedly with misrepresenting the situation, writing that
mistaken impressment never “occurred so frequently as to involve anything like the wrong and
the suffering depicted in a proclamation” given by Jefferson.62 Auchinleck continued, writing
that the American government could have “put a stop at once to the grievances” by taking steps
to prevent British seaman from being hired by American merchant ships. He painted a picture of
a desperate Britain who “was striving to rally round her standard all the stout heart and stalwart
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arms she could bring together of her own sons in a struggle for existence” while American states
“were employing…three foreign seamen to one native American.”63
Auchinleck concluded his interpretation of the causes of the War, and wrote that “the
attitude” the American had adopted “must be remembered” and that their “interposition” during
the enactment of the Berlin degree “might possibly have checked Bonaparte, and perhaps have
recalled him within the limits of international law.”64 Writing that this was the “original cause of
their subsequent misfortunes” and that it is “impossible to say how far they had themselves to
blame for those misfortunes.”65 Auchinleck then wrote about Jefferson’s “retirement” from the
presidency, writing that while he was a man of “great ability” he had done a disservice to both
his country and Great Britain by being unable to cast aside his “strong anti-British prejudice” and
instead “nourishing the war-spirit.”66 In Auchinleck’s text, Jefferson’s successor, Madison,
simply “inherited” the “embarrassment” Jefferson had left him, and while he doesn’t believe
Madison’s views differed greatly from Jefferson’s, he simply feels the fourth President was a
passive figure, influenced by his predecessor and party, lacking any real opinions of his own.67
America history was forever changed by the release of Henry Adams’ painstakingly
researched History of the United States 1801-1817. Adored by many and even called “one of the
greatest histories ever written in English” this nine-volume text was described as “remarkable for
its fullness of detail, its penetrating insight, and above all its strong, lively, and ironic style.”
Adams’ text not only dominated the historiography of the War of 1812 for nearly a century, but
essentially every piece of American history during 1801-1817, leading historians to declare
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nearly a century after its publication that “Probably no other period of American history has been
so long dominated by the work of a single historian.”68 As one may expect, this led to certain
conflicts when attempting to divide fact from Henry Adam’s biased personal opinion of
historical figures that he attempted to portray in his text.
Understanding the man Henry Adams was, is essential to understanding Adams’ work.
Despite its bias, the text was so well researched it quickly grew in popularity, causing it to
influence many and leave a lasting effect on how modern Americans perceived many events that
occurred during this time period.69 Biographer David S. Brown explained in his 2020 biography
of Henry Adams, that by understanding the person Adams was, a man he described as a
“transitional figure who bridged the chasm between colonial and modern” we can understand
much about the “movement in the late nineteenth century toward an imperial, industrial identity,
one both increasingly beholden to technology and concerned with the fate of the white race.”70
Brown was also sure to emphasize often to his readers that Adams was a “significant, yet flawed
American thinker.”71
According to Brown, Henry Adams did not initially set out to follow the path of a
scholar, instead he had hoped to follow the path set for him by previous Adams men, into a
lifelong career in public service. Adams benefited greatly from his family’s political dynasty,
believing he possessed an almost aristocratic type right to his own political greatness. However,
Adams unpopular stance on the rights of former slaves along with his openly antisemitic views,
caused an impassable fracture between him and the Republican party. Brown asserted that
68
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Adams had been “curiously incapable of recognizing the humanity of the former slaves,” and in
fact noted that Adams had written that it was “unconstitutional to award citizenship or civil
rights to freedmen.”72 Brown concluded that Adams’ “inability to read congressional
Reconstruction as a moral struggle rather than a political blunder testified to a deeper private
indifference in regard to race.”73
Adams’ reputation is still tarnished by his racist beliefs today, with a recent article in the
New York Times, concluding that “dynastic burden shaped the personality and career of the
brilliant, bitter and thoroughly unlikable man who brought the prominence of the Adams family,
and expectations for the endurance of political legacies, to an ignominious end.”74
Adams’ interpretation of the cause of the War of 1812 was unique in that he seemed “to
have been the first to recognize that an interpretation of the causes of the War of 1812 almost
exclusively on the basis of maritime matters was an oversimplification” which ultimately
resulted in a “distortion” on the current interpretation of events.75
Understanding Adams’ interpretation of Thomas Jefferson as a man was essential in
understanding the conclusions he came to concerning the decisions that were made within the
Jefferson presidency. Adams described Jefferson as follows: “[his] nature was feminine; he was
more refined than many women…he was sensitive, affectionate, and, in his own eyes, heroic. He
yearned for love and praise as no other great American ever did. He hated the clergy chiefly
because he knew that from them, he could expect neither love nor praise, perhaps not even
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forbearance.”76 Adams’ disdain for Jefferson’s (what he believed) to be inappropriate
“feminine” ways prove Adams’ was firm in his belief that Jefferson possessed severe character
deficits which prevented him from being an effectual leader. Adams also wrote that at least in
the onetime presented, Jefferson’s character flaws prevented him from performing his
presidential duties.
To support this accusation, he referenced a letter from Jefferson to Monroe in which
Jefferson expressed that “the six months’ session has worn me down to a state of almost total
incapacity for business.”77 Further criticizing Jefferson, Adams’ explained “he had brought the
country to a situation where war was impossible for want of weapons, and peace was only a
name for passive war… for the first time in seven years American democracy, struck with
sudden fear of failure, looked to him in doubt and trembled for its hopes.”78 Hoping to solidify
his accusations against Jefferson, Adams quoted the former Speaker of the House, Nathanial
Macon who wrote of Jefferson “every able diplomatist is not fit to be President,” after learning
of Jefferson’s second presidential win. Adams criticized Jefferson’s supporters as well and
argued that they gave Jefferson “warmth and undisputed regard” no matter what the matter at
hand may be.79
Adams’ work was also unique in that for the first time the impact that Jefferson’s
embargo had on causing the war was thoroughly examined.

Before this time, historians and

politicians who examined and wrote about the war often ignored just how large a part the
embargo had played, mostly due to the fact that those originally writing the histories had been
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somewhat influenced by personal relationships they shared with Jefferson, Madison, and even
Monroe. The initial response by American historians was a regurgitation of James Madison’s
war message, and the initial response from British historians was to immediately defend the
actions that had been taken by the British government. Adams attempted to explain what exactly
went wrong with Jefferson’s embargo plan. Adams asserted that although Jefferson’s
“intriguing” new policy of peaceable coercion, the withholding of America's neutral commerce
as a means of enforcing justice on the warring powers of Europe had been Jefferson’s most
“famous experiment in statescraft” with Adams noting that “he was a theorist prepared to risk the
fate of mankind on the chance of reasoning, far from certain of its details”80
Adams did not seem to find fault with Jefferson’s embargo, in theory. In fact, he likened
it to the Berlin and Milan Decrees of France, as well as compared it to England’s Orders in
Council. Where Henry Adams did find fault was in the “ending” of the embargo. Adams then
concluded that a resolution from his grandfather, Senator Adams, that sought to “appoint a
committee to consider and repot when the embargo could be taken off and vessels permitted to
arm” had been “silently rejected” by congress.81 However, Adams was sure to detail in his text
how Jefferson’s government completely failed at enforcing the embargo with its own citizens,
with Adams specifically detailing the extent of illegal trade on Lake Champlain. In the hopes of
increasing adherence to the embargo’s restrictions, the administration did eventually resort to
using military power against its citizens.82
While Adams made sure to thoroughly detail each and every fault he found with Thomas
Jefferson as both a leader and a man, Henry Adams did still manage to acknowledge several
80
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aspects of Jefferson’s vision for the young nation that he admired. Adams wrote that “Jefferson
aspired beyond the ambition of a nationality and embraced in his view the whole future of man.
That the United States should become a nation like France, England, or Russia, should conquer
the world like Rome, or develop a typical race like the Chinese, was no part of his scheme.”83
Adams continued, noting that Jefferson “wished to create a new era” envisioning “a time when
the world's ruling interest should cease to be local and should become universal; when questions
of boundaries and nationality should become insignificant, when armies and navies should be
reduced to the work of police” and concluded that Jefferson had been “eager to put his vision
into reality.”84 Adams briefly addressed issues that historians covered later in this essay focused
on, such as expansionism and native relations, however they were quickly dismissed with the
author concluding that “nothing warranted a belief that Jefferson, Madison, and Gallatin would
ever seek a quarrel with England.”85
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Chapter 2: Changing Interpretations
The Twenty sixth President of the United States Theodore Roosevelt, at the time a young
scholar, became perplexed at the currently available historical accounts of the War of 1812 and
attempted to offer an “impartial account of the war.”86 Roosevelt described what he saw as the
“almost hopeless task” of “reconciling the many and widely contradictory statements” that had
been made concerning various aspects of the war. Roosevelt specifically referenced the work of
British author William James, and his Naval Occurrences of the War of 1812. Roosevelt argued
that James’ work was both “an invaluable work, written with fulness and care” as well as “a
piece of special pleading by a bitter and not over-scrupulous partisan.”87 While Roosevelt
appreciated the depth of James’ research, he found some difficulties accepting some of the
glaring impartialities that plagued James’ text.
Newly graduated from Harvard, Roosevelt hoped to establish himself as a military
historian by producing a text that examined “much of the material in our Navy Department that
has never been touched at all.”88 Arguing that “In short, no full, accurate and unprejudiced
history of the war has ever been written.”89 While Roosevelt’s interest was in detailing the naval
battles that had occurred during the war, he also spent a significant amount of time addressing
what he believed to be the cause of the war.
Roosevelt concluded that the entirety of fault lay on England, with impressment being the
main reason in his mind. In an attempt to stay true to his original promise of providing an
unbiased account of the events, Roosevelt sought to support his theory of maritime grievances
causing the war by quoting prominent Englishmen who supported his theory, that England had
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indeed violated sovereign nations trading rights. Roosevelt first turned to British Admiral
Cochrane’s “Autobiography of a Seaman” in which the admiral wrote “our treatment of
America’s citizens was scarcely in accordance with the national privilege to which the young
Republic had become entitled… and generally treating them as though they were engaged in
contraband trade.”90
Roosevelt added an interesting grievance onto his list, when he wrote that he believed the
United States should have “undoubtably” declared war against France as well, noting that none
of the British “acts were more offensive than Napoleon's Milan decree.”91 As Roosevelt
interpreted the situation, he believed that maritime grievances had undoubtedly been the cause,
but he also concluded that the United States had simply been used as a pawn between England
and France, a weapon that could be used by one belligerent European nation to cause harm to the
other. However, Roosevelt concluded that rather than adopt a measure that had initially been
proposed in Congress to declare war on both nations, we “chose a [single] foe, the one that had
done, and could still do us the greatest injury.”92 Historian Nicole Eustace explained “Centennial
anniversaries provide unique opportunities for commemorating the past while characterizing the
present.”93 This adage proved to be true, as the centennial of the war drew the interest of new
historians who hoped to make sense of what the causes of the war had been.
In 1911 Howard T. Lewis was the first to look outside maritime disagreements as the
main cause of the war and published his brief article “A Reanalysis of the Causes of the War of
1812.” Puzzled by the strong southern and western support for the war, Lewis argued that the
90
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maritime causes did not directly affect southern and western citizens and concluded the
“maritime theory” failed to explain why these two groups led the fight in Congress to declare
war on England.94 Historian Warren H. Goodman wrote that Lewis “sought the reason for the
bellicose attitude of that section.”95 Howard T. Lewis concluded that the war “was carried out
when the West began to covet Canada’s agricultural land reserves.”96 Lewis’ article was
criticized by his colleagues as it was brief and lacked detail, however Lewis’ conclusion that “the
key to the situation was to be found in the imperative demand for more territory into which the
western immigrant might go and still be within the jurisdiction of the United States” proved to
make its mark within the historiography of the war.
In 1925 Professor Julius Pratt from Rutgers University sought a new, fully developed
perspective, influenced by the questions raised in Howard T. Lewis’ article. Pratt saw a
disconnect when he attempted to explain why certain regions of the United States supported the
war while others opposed. In what he described as a paradox Pratt explained “If the real
grievances which caused the war were interferences of Great Britain with American commerce
and the rights of American sailors, why was war to redress those grievances opposed by the
maritime section of the nation and urged by the inland section, which [England] scarcely
affected?”97 Pratt credited F.J. Turner’s 1893 essay “The Significance of the Frontier in
American History” as the muse for his theory on the causes of the war. Pratt argued that prior to
Turner’s publication, historians has regarded the frontier “as little more than a picturesque phase
in the national development” and after reading it they saw that the “West has come to be
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recognized as the source of many aspects of American character and the determining factor in
many American policies.”98
Inspired by Turner, Pratt set the following parameters for his study: “to examine the
development in the Northwest of the demand for the conquest and annexation of Canada; to trace
the rise in the South and Southwest of the plan to annex the Floridas and possibly Mexico; to
discover the relations of these two proposals to each other and to the question of war with Great
Britain; to determine the position of the executive branch of the United States government
(especially of Madison and his Secretary of State, Monroe) towards the plans for expansion.” 99
What Pratt concluded in his study was that the war had presented a unique opportunity for both
the North and South to grow somewhat proportionally at the same time. This would theoretically
then prevent a political imbalance that could potentially threaten one political party and would
therefore hopefully obviate any objections in Congress. In theory this would have solved the
problems being faced by members from both sides of the political aisles, allowing them to
answer the calls of their constituents to increase land without sacrificing any imbalances to their
political opponents.100
Pratt’s work also focused the spotlight on what he described as the “savage tribes” and
the difficulties faced by Americans because of the benefits the native tribes received from their
relations with the British.101 During debates in the House, Thomas Hartly of Pennsylvania
attempted to convince his colleagues of the seriousness of the native “problem”, exclaiming “The
American is convinced, that she [Britain] has supported the Indians in their war against us.
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Ammunition and arms they certainly obtained from British agents or factors.”102 Pratt continued,
arguing that at the time Americans were fearful of what he described as an “Indian Menace”
emerging from out west.
Two Native American brothers by the name of Tecumseh and The Prophet had recently
become very successful in their endeavor to create an Indian Confederacy, or rather an
agreement between several large tribes to ban together to save their lands, creating fear and panic
amongst American settlers. Pratt argued that the rise of the “Indian Menace” out west cased a
“general conviction on the part of the whites that the plans of Tecumseh and the Prophet were
really hostile to the United States.”103 Pratt continued, arguing that this growing problem along
with the “strong suspicion that the British were lending sympathy and support to these Indian
leaders who sought to make their resistance to land sales a dam in the progress of the great
waters of the white advance ”would ultimately result in a war, whether Americans liked it or
not.”104
While he had acknowledged that Indiana Governor William Henry Harrison, the
“representative of American justice and benevolence towards the Indians” had a respectful
friendship with General Sir Isaac Brock, the Major-General of Lower Canada, Pratt also noted
that the British had simply fooled the Indiana Governor with a false friendship. Pratt explained
that while General Brock wrote to Harrison that he had “implicitly told [the native tribes] not to
look for assistance from us” it had simply been a part of a particularly evil British policy, its
purpose being to “allow time for the consolidation of [Tecumseh’s Confederacy] that the aid of
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the Indians might be more effective when needed.”105 The Battle of Tippecanoe in November of
1811, a Battle waged by Governor Harrison on Tecumseh’s Prophetstown home, was what
brought the “West to an eagerness for war,” Pratt explained.106
While Harrison was able to obliterate the village, and deliver a temporary blow to
Tecumseh’s Confederacy, the soldiers’ blood that was shed there enraged Americans. Future
President and soon to be War of 1812 hero, Andrew Jackson angrily scolded Harrison,
demanding that “the blood of our murdered countrymen must be revenged! I do hope that
Government will see that it is necessary to act efficiently and that this hostile band which must
be excited to war by the secret agents of Great Britain must be destroyed.”107
While Pratt presented several interesting points in his text, it is important to emphasize
that Pratt himself explained in his introduction that he wanted to approach the causes of the War
of 1812 specifically through the lens of F.J. Turner’s work, placing a particular focus on
westward expansion as the cause of the war. Pratt also explained that his work made “no effort
to give a full account of the causes of the War of 1812 but deals with one set of causes only.”108
He continued noting “the exclusion from all but briefest mention of the maritime grievances
against Great Britain is with no wish to belittle them. Without them, it is safe to say, there would
have been no war.”109 It is important to also note that Pratt’s work was the first to place
expansionist ideals on the inhabitants of the Southern United States.
In 1931 George Rogers Taylor responded to Pratt’s article, offering another answer to the
question of why westerns and southerners “led the charge” for a war against England in 1812. In
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his article “Agrarian Discontent In the Mississippi Valley Preceding the War of 1812” Taylor
concluded that historians had not fully understood the issue at hand. Taylor wrote “the attitude
of the western settler can hardly be evaluated without an understanding of his economic position.
He was, after all, typically an ambitious farmer.”110 Taylor continued, explaining that the
Louisiana purchase had made the western lands a “veritable promise land” however, the trade
disagreements between England, France, and the United States forced prices of produce so low
that when these farmers went to market they saw their “venture was a failure.”111 These market
conditions had been the result of Jefferson’s Embargo and Non-Intercourse acts, but Taylor
explained that these “peaceful methods” were viewed by many as necessary weapons against
“the European belligerents”112 Taylor concluded when peaceful methods failed “the hopeful
settlers of earlier years became the War Hawks of 1812.”113
Unsatisfied with where the historiography on the causes of the war of 1812 was heading,
historian Warren H. Goodman wrote “The Origins of the War of 1812: A Survey of Changing
Interpretations” in 1941. Goodman’s work focused on the effect that Henry Adam’s work had
on the interpretations of what caused the war. Goodman asserted that “the two decades
following the publication of Adam’s work form[ed] a period of confusion in the history of the
interpretation of the War of 1812.”114 Quoting Roosevelt’s take on the interpretations of the
cause of the war, “The grounds of the war were singularly uncertain” Goodman argued that the
main fruits of Adam’s efforts were “a feeling of insecurity on the part of those historians who
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took their stand on the maritime rights interpretation.”115 While Goodman noted that Henry
Adams’ work was “sufficiently influenced by the traditional interpretation” explaining that
Adams argued “had Great Britain revoked the Orders in Council in March 1812, no war could
have taken place, unless it were a war with France” Goodman also shone a light on the fact that
“Adams was the first to imply that the plan for the conquest of Canada had been a contributing
cause of the war rather than a method of carrying on a struggle undertaken for other reasons.”116
Goodman continued, writing that “Adams seem[d] to have been the first to recognize that an
interpretation of the causes of the War of 1812 almost exclusively on the basis of maritime
matters was an oversimplification and, consequently, a distortion….his own treatment of the
subject was rather a modified acceptance of the orthodox thesis than abandonment of it.”117
Specifically, Goodman wanted to show the glaring faults he saw within Howard T. Lewis, Julius
Pratt and George Rodger Taylor’s work.
Goodman asserted that “in 1911 historians came to a fork in the hitherto single road to an
understanding of the cause of the war of 1812. Howard T. Lewis set out in a direction which had
not been travelled before when he declared that the war had been fought mainly because the
West coveted the agricultural land reserves of Canada.”118 As suggested in this essay, Lewis
argued that the maritime rights explanation failed to explain why the war was supported by
southerners and westerners. Lewis concluded that “the key to the situation was to be found in
the imperative demand for more territory into which the western immigrant might go and still be
within the jurisdiction and protection of the United States.”119
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While Goodman acknowledged that “it cannot be denied that the War of 1812 was less
popular in New York and New England…to consider the struggle [for war[ solely a project of
the West is laboring the point…that section alone could not have mustered the 79 votes cast in
the House of Representatives.”120 Goodman also argued that historians treating the conquest of
Canada as a newly adopted idea that had originated in the west failed to note that “the conquest
of Canada was widely discussed and openly advocated in the South as early as the summer of
1807,” using a toast from Richmond on July 4, 1807 in which a man toasted “the memory of
General Montgomery who nobly perished under the walls of Quebec. Equal glory and better
fortune to these heroes who man soon have to follow in his footsteps.”121 Goodman’s footnotes
on the matter show that the toast had been printed in the Enquirer on July 24, 1807, with one
editor who “went so far as to present a detailed plan for military operation against Canada.”122
Goodman’s conclusion showed that there was proof such an idea had already permeated
throughout southern society years before westerners had expressed any desire to expand
territory.
Next, Goodman set out to disprove Julius Pratt’s theory that the southern and western
support for the war was due to expansionist efforts and fears concerning the potential threat from
Tecumseh’s confederacy, believed to be instigated by British agitators. For this, Goodman
firstly conceded that these were generally understood to be “contributing causes.”123 However,
he argued that those praising Pratt’s work failed to heed Pratt’s own warning, that the text “
ma[de] no effort to give a full account of the causes of the War of 1812, but deals with one set of
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causes only.”124 Goodman continued, writing “granting the tenability of Pratt’s conclusions in
their entirety, the quest for a well-integrated presentation of the causes of the war is not ended.
A long step in the right direction has been made, but the task of fitting Pratt’s one set of causes
into the whole picture remains to be done.”125
In response to George Rogers Taylor, Goodman recognized the value of Taylor’s
contribution to the historiography of the causes of the war. He wrote “Taylor had shown that the
British orders and French decrees caused a contraction of the market for western staples and,
consequently, a decline in prices and an economic depression. The westerner believed his
economic hardship could be alleviated by forcing a repeal.”126 While Goodman did not dispute
Taylor’s work, he concluded that like Pratt “Taylor’s conclusions must be considered in the light
of his own statement that he was dealing with but one set of causes and that factors other than
those emphasized in his study undoubtedly played a part in bringing on the war.”127 In fact,
Goodman noted that Taylor’s argument proved how westerners were, contrary to what many
historians had written before, directly affected by the maritime issues that existed at the time.128
Goodman ended his article abruptly, almost angrily, clearly showing his frustrations and
calling for a “complete reexamination of the sources.”129 Goodman concluded that “the
foregoing survey hardly explains the genesis of the War of 1812. Until a definitive study of the
sources is made, historians will have to be content with [Woodrow] Wilson’s statement that the
grounds of the war were singularly uncertain.”130
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Professor Alfred Leroy Burt, a Canadian historian, emerged challenging the “departure
from maritime causes.”131 Burt vehemently opposed the emerging viewpoints of the time, such
as Julius Pratt’s, that blamed Native Americans and western aims for the war. Burt’s work had
been in publication, being released right around the time as Goodman’s article, but the fact that
the two historians came to similar conclusions at the same time, shows not only the merit their
theories held, but also confirms the trend that occurred in the historiography of the causes of the
war during this time period. Burt primarily argued that theories such as Pratt’s did not give
enough weight to the events that were occurring between France and England during this time
period.132 A.L. Burt wrote “Issues and the Evolution of Causes of the War of 1812” with the
mission of refuting Pratt’s thesis, that Western aims and “native aggressors” were what caused
the war. Instead, Burt returned to a more classic view, arguing that impressment and trade
aggressions were the cause. His approach focused on examining a larger world view. Burt
explained “To understand the French decrees and the British Orders-in-Council we should
remember that they accompanied the approach of the supreme crisis in the life and death struggle
between the two powers which were then by far the greatest on earth.”133 In essence, Burt
argued the United States was caught in the middle with both “belligerents coercing neutrals to
serve its own end.”134 A.L. Burt’s text attempted to remain neutral, hoping to explain how
certain events could have felt as if belligerent nations were attempting to take advantage of the
United States’ neutrality. Burt’s text supplied his readers with a variety of primary sources with
a focus on British primary sources.
131

Clifford L. Egan, “The Origins of the War of 1812: Three Decades of Historical Writing,” Military Affairs 38, no. 2
(1974): p. 72.
132
Ibid.
133
George Rogers Taylor, The War of 1812: Past Justifications and Present Interpretations (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1980), 69.
134
Ibid, p.69.

32

Burt wrote quite bluntly that the fault, in fact, lay squarely on Napoleon’s shoulders. His
“fantastic” inverted blockade, which was ordered to seize all British goods “and also under pain
of confiscation, the exclusion of every ship that touched at a British port” effectively denied
Britain access “to the European market on which her economic life depended.”135 Burt asserted
that this “Continental System” Napoleon created was sure to destroy the British nation as they
were completely dependent on the manufacturing of goods and trading them to survive, noting
that “the Orders-In-Council were her desperate reply.”136
The Orders-In-Council, Burt charged, made “the position of neutrals impossible.”137 Burt
explained that the “real issue was the Continental System. Would they cooperate with Napoleon
in upholding it, or with Britain in undermining it?”138 Neutral American merchant vessels
“could not approach any European port that was under Napoleon’s sway without being liable to
seizure, either outside by a ship of the Royal Navy or inside by Napoleon’s officials; inside, if it
had touched at a British port, or had procured British papers; outside, if it had not.”139 Burt
explained the impossibility of the situation, writing “It was a choice between the devil and the
deep sea.”140
Burt continued, explaining that while “both belligerents this time flouted the United
States” with both being “equally oppressive; but practically, legally, and psychologically they
were not. Britain’s control of the sea, being greater than Napoleon’s control of the land, gave her
greater power of enforcement.”141 Until this point, Burt placed both belligerents at fault with the
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majority of fault falling on Napoleon. However, Burt wrote that there were significant legal
differences in the search and seizure of neutral ships. Burt claimed that England’s “seizures
were made at sea and therefore, according to her own admission, were a violation of neutral
rights under international law.”142 Napoleon’s search and seizures, on the other hand, occurred
almost exclusively in ports “within the undoubted jurisdiction of his own or a subordinate
government.”143
Burt wrote that “Americans were convinced that Britain was abusing her temporary
belligerent rights to serve her permanent economic interest and that in doing so she was furtively
dealing a dangerous blow at their country. They saw her trying, under cover of the war, to
monopolize the commerce of the world.”144 Burt attempted to explain some of the decisions
that came out of Britain, noting that the British were “exasperated by the paradox of their
position” in hopes of reminding readers that the British did not act out of aggression.145 He
continued, writing “Never had they possessed such complete control of the sea, yet more than
ever the sea-borne trade of the enemy was escaping from their grasp.”146
The Americans, however, did not share Burt’s perspective. Burt argued that the “Royal
Navy was supreme…and she held the world in fee. It is not surprising, therefore, that nonBritish eyes saw in the orders-in-council a new and ruthless protection of old and selfish British
design.” This was where the cause of the war truly fell, in Burt’s eyes. The Orders-In-Council
“were particularly offensive. The reason for their peculiar sensitiveness lay in their own history:
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they were being forced back into the dependence of colonial days.”147 Burt summarized what he
believed the cause of the War of 1812 was in one succinct sentence: “American Independence
was at Stake!”148
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Chapter 3: The Sixties Renews Interest
Braford Perkins published his text Prologue to War in 1961. As noted in his preface,
Perkins wrote that he sought to answer Warren H. Goodman’s call for “a comprehensive work on
the subject …to correlate and synthesize the various sets of causes.”149 Perkins succeeded in his
work, which was hailed by other scholars as “the most sweeping monograph published in
decades”.150 A Harvard graduate, Perkins was an American historian whose father was also a
historian who studied the same time period.151 Perkins criticized his predecessors, and claimed
that “notably, no scholar since Henry Adams has examined more than the most obvious English
materials.”152 Perkins argued that this had been a fatal flaw in historical interpretations and that
he had “therefore devoted much of [his] attention to the development of British policy, virtually
caricatured by too many American historians.”153 Perkins described where he found holes in the
previous historiography, arguing “previous interpretations…seem to me inadequate. I believe
scholars have overemphasized the tangible, rational reasons for action and, while not ignoring,
have given too little heed to such things as nation pride, sensitivity, and frustration.”154
Perkins continued, noting that his work centered around one common thesis, that “the
American search for national respectability and true independence from Europe” noting that
“relations with Britain form[ed] the most important part of this theme” and also explaining that
“relations with Spain and many parts of Franco-American relations, which would have
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complicated the main story.”155 Perkins spent a large portion of his preface detailing the sources
used for his work, which most notably included the use of materials from the Royal Archives,
something that Perkins noted had not been done before.156 Perkins wrote that the two of the most
important historical studies were those of Henry Adams and Alfred L. Burt.157 Perkins also
explained where he believed his predecessors fell short. While acknowledging that “no student
of these years can fail to owe a great debt to Henry Adams” Perkins exquisitely explained
Adams’ shortcomings, noting that “Adams is almost unreservedly hostile toward the Republican
leaders and, as Irving Brant has shown, is not above shading the evidence in a fashion modern
historians would consider improper.”158
Acknowledging the contribution Adams had made with his examination of British
manuscripts, Perkins wrote that Adams’ “attitude toward England is colored with the nationalism
of the period in which he wrote.”159 As previously written about in this essay, one may also
safely come to the conclusion that Adams’ beliefs were most likely not only shaped by the time
in which he wrote, but also by the beliefs of his ancestors. As far as Burt was concerned, Perkins
explained that “his work, with a few exceptions on the British side, rests primarily on printed
materials, both primary and secondary. His judgements are judicious, but Burt perhaps fails to
capture the emotional fire of the period.”160 In fact, Perkins criticized most of his colleagues,
arguing that “historians of Anglo- American relations have far less frequently exploited British
manuscripts.”161 Perkins also noted that “the position of Spencer Perceval and his allies has
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recently become much more understandable with the gathering of the premier’s papers” which
Perkins had been granted access to through the Queen.162 Perkins discussed the “War Hawks” a
clique of young republicans who repeatedly and loudly called for war, however Perkins
concluded that “national honor was the War Hawks’ central concern.”163
Perkins explained that the “war came, not because of the President, but despite him…
The war came, not for any single reason, but from the interplay of many. The nation did not
want war, and surely it did not embark gleefully on a great crusade. Tired of the self-flagellation
and the disgrace that had marked the yeads since 1805, propelled by the fear of ridicule for
inconsistency and by an honest interest in the nation’s honor, a sufficient number of
congressmen allowed themselves to support war.”164 After extensive examination of primary
sources from both nations, Bradford Perkins concluded that while “neither side sought the War
of 1812, in the short run it was tragically unnecessary.”165
While examining the current historical trends of the 1960s, historian Irwin Unger
explained how “social sciences have profoundly influenced complex views of the past…enabling
the new generation of historians to obscure conflict in America by psychoanalyzing it.”166 Unger
argued that this “shift in analysis of conflict reduced the emotional charge of past historical
events” making it more difficult to separate the “heroes” from the “villains.”167 When examining
the context of Perkins’ conclusion, it is clear that the trends in 1960s American historiography
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influenced how Perkins interpreted the actions of the British, forcing him to see their side of the
conflict and the struggle for England’s existence against Napoleon.
English born historian Reginald Horsman’s 1962 text The Causes of the War of 1812 was
also critical of the historiography that so far existed concerning the causes of the war. Horsman
believed that one fatal atrocity had been committed by the American historians, they had failed
to look outside their own shores, and he continued the trend of post Goodman scholars hoping to
find the cause of the war outside of the United States. Horsman charged “previous historians” (a
statement that appears to be directed at Julius Pratt and his Expansionists of 1812) with placing
far too large of an overemphasis on western expansion as a cause for the War. While noting the
“considerable effort” previous authors had put forth to “differentiate between a number of
possible American causes,” Horsman asserted that the true cause had been completely passed
by.168
Horsman thoroughly examined many sources from both United States politicians, as well
as British diplomats and came to one conclusion. While Pratt had been correct that “a bitter
anger arose in America at Indian hostilities” and he had also been correct that “the idea of
conquering Canada had been present,” Horsman argued that “the conquest of Canada was
primarily a means of waging war, not a reason for starting it.”169 Horsman continued,
concluding his work with the following bold statement: “British policy, though influenced by
jealousy of American commercial growth, stemmed primarily from the necessity of waging war
against France. Had there been no war with France, there would have been no Orders in
Council, no impressment, and, in all probability, no War of 1812.”170

168

Reginald Horsman, The Causes of the War of 1812 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 263.
Ibid, p.267.
170
Ibid.
169

39

While Horsman’s argument reflected many of the same sentiments that had recently been
written by Gilbert Auchinleck, Horsman’s work did reflect the pattern of change at the time that
was also seen in Bradford Perkin’s work. Both historians seemed to have been set on attempting
to reconcile both American and British actions, and also sought to severely decrease the
emphasis on western aims as the cause, reminding historians to heed the warning Pratt had
placed in his own work.171
In 1964, Roger H. Brown’s The Republic in Peril: 1812 was published. Brown’s work
had not only been inspired by the recent trend called for by Goodman to re-examine the sources
on the cause for the war, but also by another trend in historiography. In his preface, Brown
acknowledged a recent article from historian Cecelia Kenyon, “Republicanism and Radicalism in
the American Revolution: An Old-Fashioned Interpretation.” Brown wrote that Kenyon’s article
had inspired his thoughts in his text by “suggesting the importance of republicanism in the
American Revolution.”172 Through this new lens, Brown argued that his text worked in
conjunction with Kenyon’s, “reinforcing” one another and that they “form a coherent pattern of
new interpretation in the history of the Revolutionary and early national periods.”173 As for
Brown’s belief on what led to the declaration of war in 1812, Brown noted that his work “shows
for the first time how republicanism and concern for the republican experiment led to the
American decision to declare war on Great Britain in 1812.”174 Brown also cautioned his readers
that his work did “not attempt to be a full account of the diplomatic controversy that led to war
nor of the political and parliamentary maneuvering that produced the final war declaration.”175
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While using his “republicanism” lens, Brown claimed that Jeffersonian republicans “felt
a heavy responsibility in challenging British and French maritime practices.”176 Brown
continued, declaring that “In their eyes the prestige of the Republic and of their own party
depended on protection of American commerce against the restrictions and seizures of the
European belligerents. They could have imagined no more momentous a task.”177 As Brown
saw it, President Jefferson, and the current Secretary of State at the time, James Madison, “were
confidant” that their embargo would “instill respect for [America’s] maritime rights.”178
Brown also devoted his conclusion to illustrate the many ways the nation had been so
divided along party lines during its formative years. He described what he called a “party
conflict” that was a “very different phenomenon from today’s political contests between
Democrats and Republicans…spirit of part ran high, divided families, neighborhoods, towns &
states” with Brown even describing weddings and funerals that were boycotted due to mixing of
people with differing political beliefs.179 While Brown’s work may not have entirely been
focused on refuting the specific trends of historiography that were occurring amongst those
studying the causes of the War of 1812, his work does an excellent job on focusing his reader on
the political animosity that existed at the time.
In 1965, military history professor Harry L. Coles published his text The War of 1812.
Following the path of recent historians, Coles opened his work with the following statement “the
War of 1812 resulted from the unsuccessful efforts of the United States to maintain its interests
and its honor in a world divided into two-armed camp. Both in its origins and in the way it was
fought, the war was an outgrowth of a General European conflict that raged from 1793 to
176
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1815.”180 Coles continued, writing that although the reasons for the coming of the war were
“many and complicated,” his also noted that while “historians are by no means in agreement on
the relative weight to be attributed to various factors, they have in general discussed two sets of
causes: maritime grievances and western aims.”181 Like Perkins, Coles reframed the Napoleonic
wars, declaring that the British saw their fight as one between good and evil. Attempting to
convey the feelings of the British at the time, Coles explained “since Britain fought for the right,
it was plainly the duty of other nations, particularly the United States, which owed its very
existence to Britain, to subordinate national goals to the interest of the struggle which was being
waged on behalf of mankind.”182 Again, echoing the work of those before him, Coles concluded
that the United States became a weapon that one European superpower hoped to wield to attack
the other, writing “unable to get at one another directly, each side attempted to bring the enemy
to terms by means of economic strangulation.”183
What set Coles work apart from the other historiography of this time period was his
thoughts on President Thomas Jefferson’s embargo. Coles asserted that “all the founding
fathers, whether Federalist of Republican, agreed on a policy of non-involvement in European
conflicts.”184 Coles charged that the politicians at the time believed it extremely likely that they
would be pulled into a conflict between the two European nations despite their best efforts to
avoid conflict. As such, Coles argued that “they felt that a period of isolation was desirable in
order that the United States achieve and maintain freedom of action, freedom to choose, as
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Washington put it, war or peace as their interest might dictate” at least giving them the
appearance of having the ability to make their own choice as an independent nation.185
Coles also explained why President Jefferson did not adequately prepare for war. To
Coles the answer was simple, his “doctrine demanded an alternative to war.”186 While
Federalists called for the nation to ready for war, Coles noted “the Republicans could not accept
this because armies and navies meant encouraging militarism, contracts for private business at
public expense, and high taxes, all of which they loathed.”187 While agreeing with previous
historians (such as Henry Adams) that the notion of peaceable coercion through an embargo was
a “noble experiment” Coles argued that Jefferson’s embargo “accomplished nothing
diplomatically but nearly succeeded in turning the American people against one another.”188
Coles’ work was favored by educators for decades due to its depth of research and readability.
Sensing a need to refocus the historiography, in 1974 Clifford L. Egan published his
article “The Origins of the War of 1812: Three Decades of Historical Writing.” Egan wrote that
his paper had three goals in mind: “to provide a guide to the work that has accumulated since
Goodman’s essay, to present the major and minor issues that historians believed figured in the
origins of the second Anglo-American conflict, and to suggest further research opportunities.”189
Egan most importantly acknowledged how Burt’s book had been published at the same time as
Goodman’s article, and credited Burt for accomplishing just what Goodman had called for, a full
refutation of Pratt’s thesis set forth in his 1925 Expansionists of 1812. Egan also praised and
criticized Perkins’ work. While acknowledging the depth of Perkins’ British research, Egan
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noted that western and southern sources were lacking. Egan also claimed that author accepted
partisan Federalist views of Jefferson and Madison.190 As for Reginald Horsman’s text, Egan
called it “judicious and concise.”191
A bit before his time, Egan wrote that he had been excited for the attention Madison had
been recently receiving for his role in the start of war, explaining that although historians had not
been able to “reach a general agreement on Madison,” the examination of sources on that subject
would prove interesting.192 Eagan noted that the historiography had specifically fallen short in
examining Franco-American relations during the Napoleonic era, and called for historians to
conduct such a study, one he believed would “place the events prior to 1812 in a new
perspective.”193 Nine years later, Egan answered his own call.
Clifford L. Egan’s 1983 book Neither Peace Nor War: Franco-American Relations,
1803-1812 hoped to fill a hole the author saw in the current narrative, and explain France’s role
in the decision to call for war. Egan concluded that “some observations are in order about the
decision for war. A declaration of war was not the miraculous event some historians have
portrayed it to be rather the miracle was that American patience with the belligerents lasted so
long.”194 Egan continued, explaining that “the primary causes of the War of 1812 were the
issues of American national honor, the sense of humiliation suffered at the hands of Great Britain
in the forms of impressment and the violation of neutral rights.”195 Egan’s work does a brilliant
job in explaining how the Americans got caught up in “commercial warfare” between France and
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England, absolving all politicians of any wrongdoing and claiming that no matter what had
happened “the longer Anglo-French hostilities endured, the greater the risk became for America
because the cross-channel foes would enforce ever more Draconian and confusing economic
measures to crush each other.”196
In 1983 J.C.A. Stagg published Mr. Madison’s War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in
the Early American Republic 1783-1830. This study was unique in that for the first time the
focus was heavily turned to Madison, and his involvement in British relations since 1783. Stagg
wrote that initially he had hoped to produce a study that examined “the operational histories of
[the war’s] various military and naval campaigns.”197 However, the author explained that he
soon became “preoccupied with conflicting theories of causation” describing this existing
historiography as a “tangled matter.”198 Stagg wrote that he then decided to research two topics
he believed desperately needed to be further explained. Stagg noted the following two questions
that inspired his work, “first is why James Madison believed he could win a war against Great
Britain, and win it, moreover, by seizing Canada. The second deals with why the war occurred
when it did.”199 Here, Stagg was referencing critics of the maritime theory as the cause of the
war of 1812. Many of them argued that if impressment of American sailors had been the main
cause of the war, then why had war not been declared when the Chesapeake incident had
occurred several years prior to the start of the war, especially when many felt the situation had
not been properly settled? Stagg’s work explained both of these issues thoroughly.

196

Ibid, xvi.
J.C.A. Stagg, Mr. Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American Republic, 1783-1830
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), ix.
198
Ibid.
199
Ibid.
197

45

Stagg charged Madison with wanting to bring Great Britain to heel by “invading and
occupying Great Britain’s Canadian possessions” referencing a letter James Monroe wrote to
John Taylor on June 13, 1812, in which Monroe informed Taylor that Canada was seen “not as
an object of the war but as a means to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion.”200 The author
continued, asserting that Madison had established diplomatic goals for the young nation in the
1790s, writing that his “single most important diplomatic goal” was “American entry into the
carrying trade of the British West Indies.”201 Stagg continued, noting that Madison referenced
the effectiveness of a brief embargo passed by Congress in 1794 in letters at the time, relaying
his elation that the embargo had quickly led to “very different language from Britain,” as the
embargo had caused scarcities of essential supplies in Britain’s West Indies colonies.202 Stagg
wrote that the sugar trade in the West Indies was far too valuable for the British to not concede to
the Americans, noting that as this had worked so successfully in 1794, Madison and Jefferson
had no reason to believe that their embargo would be any less effective. Stagg concluded that
Madison believed he had discovered what could finally destroy the British empire and elevate
the position of the Americans in the world, “Madison concluded that Britain could only remain
prosperous so long as its navigation could constantly enlarge its markets, monopolize the trade
routes of the world, and the rely on the Royal Navy for protection.”203
Stagg wrote that “Madison did not want the embargo to give way to war” however, the
author also acknowledged that Madison “seriously miscalculated both the unpopularity of the
measure in the northern states and the problems of enforcing it.”204 This, is what the author
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concluded to be behind the cause of Madison’s desire to invade Canada. As far as the timing of
the war, the author argued that it was merely Madison’s hopes that war would never have to be
an option. The years that followed the Chesapeake incident had been filled with negotiations in
an attempt to avoid war at all costs, Stagg argued, noting that Madison even explained to “the
British minister that the United States was in no position to commence hostilities.”205 Cementing
his argument, Stagg referenced a letter Madison wrote almost a month before his death, to
Congressman Charles Jared Ingersoll. The former president, thrilled with recent political events
wrote that “Britain could no longer hope to continue [to be] mistress of the seas…the trident,
must pass to this hemisphere where is may be hoped it will be less abused than it had been on the
other.”206
Donald R. Hickey’s The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, was first published in 1989.
Hickey noted in the preface of his text, that he had become interested in the history of the war
during the late 1960s when the historiography from the field was being published at a significant
rate. Dr. Hickey wrote that his book was an attempt to provide a “needed…broader treatment of
the war- one that dealt with politics, diplomacy, economics, and finance as well as battles and
campaigns…a study, in other words, that more fully explored Republican politics and their
impact on the nation.”207 What made Hickey’s work particularly special, was the audience the
author had in mind. Hickey wrote that he had hoped the text would serve as a “short,
comprehensive study” that would be suitable for “students and others interested in a general
overview of the war. Hickey had also hoped his work would prove to be an important study that
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“reexamines the sources and contains new material…in short, this work is designed to be both a
textbook and a monograph and to appeal to generalists and specialists alike.”208
As for the causes of the war, Hickey wrote that the reason the War of 1812 remains “our
most obscure war” is partly due to the fact “that its causes are shrouded in mystery.”209 Hickey
explained that despite this obscurity, we should not be blinded to the war’s “significance” as he
believed the war to have been “an important turning point, a great watershed, in the history of the
young republic.”210 When writing about the cause of the war, rather than present any new ideas,
Hickey simply reiterated the current prevailing causes, maritime concerns. As this monograph
was intended to be a text that would be accessible to a those from a variety of educational
backgrounds, Hickey concisely presents an account of the various decrees and orders that
infringed on American trading rights. In the end, Hickey’s work simply echoed what had
already been presented by other historians. Criticizing the Americans, Hickey wrote “not only
did Republicans misread British intentions, but throughout this turbulent era they consistently
overrated America’s ability to win concessions.”211 As for Hickey’s opinions on the actions of
the British, he wrote “her aim was not to subvert American independence but to win the war in
Europe. Once this objective was achieved, her infringements on American rights would cease,”
again echoing the findings of other historians from two and a half decades earlier.212
In an article entitled “The War of 1812 Revisited” War of 1812 historian Reginald
Horseman not only revisited his text The Causes of the War of 1812, but he also offered an
interesting critique of Donald Hickey’s The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict. After over three

208

Ibid, p.xii.
Ibid, p.1.
210
Ibid, p.3.
211
Ibid, p.300.
212
Ibid.
209

48

decades studying the War, Horseman explained that he had “sometimes wondered if the flow of
books and articles on the War of 1812 can possibly be never ending.”213 He continued,
explaining that “the causes of that strange little war have been interpreted, reinterpreted, and rereinterpreted by a variety of historians.”214 His major critique with Hickey’s work was that it
lacked any “striking new interpretation” but rather seemed to simply fill the hole Hickey
believed to be existing in the historiography at the time, a “modern, broader treatment of the
war.”215
Horseman critiqued what he called the “least satisfactory part of the book,” the two
chapters were Hickey had examined the coming of the War of 1812. Horseman scolded Hickey
for his failure to place “his own imprint” when discussing the causes of the war and argued that
Hickey had simply “[tried] to achieve a balance between [explaining] the various arguments
advanced by earlier historians.”216 After his critique of what he described as Hickey’s
“smorgasbord” approach in analyzing the causes, Horseman noted that he believed Hickey had
supported the same argument that Bradford Perkins popularized, which had been that the cause
of the war was due to the way the Republicans responded to various foreign affairs crises,
specifically the Monroe-Pickney Treaty, Horsman explained.217 Horseman continued, writing
that Hickey had a “problem of perspective” which was “particularly noticeable in the omission of
any general attempt to integrate” British perspective in his “American-oriented” research.218 The
only thing that Horsman seemed to have appreciated about Hickey’s monograph, was that it was
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“up to date” with the arguments, while also being accessible to readers of any educational
background.
Perhaps a more interesting topic in this article was Reginald Horsman’s reexamination of
his own 1960s work, The Causes of War of 1812. Horsman explained that “since that time, I
have altered some of my views.”219 Horsman wrote that because “Pratt’s arguments were so
persuasive and influential that for forty years historians overreacted in their efforts to place the
causes of the war back within the context of the European wars and British maritime policies.”220
After taking several decades to reflect, Horsman concluded that “I now believe that there were
many politicians in the United States who saw the invasion and retention of Canada as a useful
side benefit of a war that had become necessary largely because of British maritime policies”
showing a meshing of the ideas that had emerged in the 1960s along with the arguments
presented by Pratt.221 Horsman also acknowledged the influence Stagg’s work had on his
opinion, writing that his arguments convinced him that Madison and Jefferson found value in the
acquisition of Canada. As for the future, Horsman declared that “a regional approach to the war
of 1812 era would seem to offer more chances for a new contribution than the Sisyphean labor of
constantly reappraising and rearranging the causes.”222 As time would have it, Horsman was
somewhat correct, as the works that were released in the next decades did begin to examine other
aspects of the war.
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Chapter 4: Bicentennial Anniversary Renews Interest
While historians in the end of the twentieth and early twenty first century did produce
some studies on the War of 1812, these works tended to examine topics that focused on naval
and military strategy, rather that attempting to decipher the causes of the war.223 However, the
nearing of the anniversary of the War of 1812 drew fresh perspectives from a new generation of
historians. Works in the twenty first century have provided a plethora of new topics concerning
the War of 1812. From the involvement of women in the war, to the involvement of slaves vs.
freed men, to the involvement of differencing religious groups such as the Baptists, historians
seem to be answering Reginald Horsman’s call to contribute something “new” to the
conversation on the war.
While the new generation tended to focus less on reassessing the causes, a few works that
have emerged over the last decade have tended to agree with the idea that “maritime grievances”
were at the root of the conflict. These historians seemed to follow a pattern of focusing less
attention on Jefferson’s involvement, and more starting to scrutinize James Madison’s every
move for more than a decade before the war. Historians at this time also seem to agree that to
some extent “American exceptionalism” played a role not only the declaration, but also the
ability of the war to gain popularity and traction with the masses.
In Jeremy Black’s The War of 1812 in The Age of Napoleon, Black attempted to place the
confusion concerning the cause of the war within a larger context. Black noted “in particular, it
is necessary to look at the character of American society and public culture, because these
explain much about the drive to war and about the nature of the conflict.”224 Black argued that
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the cause of the war, while “a matter of historical debate,” was due to “a key element.”225
According to Black “Jefferson and others overestimated American power after his success in
acquiring Louisiana from France in 1803.”226 Black continued, noting that “while Jefferson
understood the potential of the West and was correct in his long-term appraisal that the USA
would become a world power, he mistook Americas marginal leverage in the bipolar dynamic
between Britain and France for a situation in which all three were major powers,” a mistake that
Black believed caused the embargo disaster, and eventually the war.227
As many historians before him had done, Black argued that Jefferson’s student and
successor, Madison, “followed his reasoning reflexively.”228 Black asserted that Jefferson and
Madison “saw little reason to compromise,” with both European belligerents, with the men
falsely assuming “Britain would back down in the face of American anger and preparations for
war.”229 Black argued that it was at this point that the two men learned “that they could not
dictate the pace of events.”230 In defense of the British, Black wrote that the British did indeed
compromise, however it was dismissed as “inadequate” and “too late,” by Madison.231
Another important factor that contributed to the start of war in 1812 was, according to
Black, due to simple “visceral hatred” between men from both nations. Black blamed both the
British Prime Minister Spencer Perceval and the British Foreign Secretary Richard Marquess
Wellesley for their “visceral anti-Americanism” as well as Jefferson and Madison for their
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“visceral hatred of Great Britain.”232 Black charged that the maritime and trade “hostilities” were
much more difficult to negotiate due to the history of “harmed relations” that existed between the
men at the time.233 Black wrote that specific animosity between both those in the British and
American governments had obviously been festering for decades as they had all been involved in
the “bitter” Revolutionary war as adversaries.234
Black explained that eventually Madison’s thoughts on the situation changed, mostly due
to the “domestic pressures” the resulted from the failed embargo.235 Black argued that current
affairs had led “Jeffersonians to fear for the survival of the republic. Unsuccessful as a tool of
foreign policy, non-importation had also resulted in major economic stains, and this was
increasing opposition to the government,” which all caused Madison to reverse course.236 Black
wrote that Madison also feared for the future of his party as Federalists seemed to be gaining
some traction in elections.237 Black concluded that Madison was therefore left with only two
choices, “back down or force Britain to back down.”238 Firmly rebuking Madison’s decision,
Black argued that Madison “underestimated the risks of the latter and failed to appreciate the
prudence of the former.”239 To Black, it was clear that American exceptionalism led Madison
down the wrong path many times, ultimately leading to war.
As for Congress’ support for the war, Black again circled back to his idea of misplaced
American confidence. He argued that while the Congressional War Hawks had been fueled by
“patriotic anger with British policies” it was also a “very much a planned party measure by the
232
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Republicans.”240 Black noted that their party outrage was generally geared towards
impressment, as it had “been seen as a particular outrage, as it represented an infringement of the
national sovereignty of American vessels and a denial of America’s ability to naturalize
foreigners.”241
Black also took this opportunity to discuss the possibility that Native Americans had been
instigated by the British, thus leading to an outbreak of war. This echoed the “savage native”
argument that had been popularized by historians in the early twentieth century. Black
somewhat dismissed this idea, but also acknowledged that some truth may indeed be there. He
wrote that “the activities of British officials, officers, and traders on the frontier that, in large
part, justifie[d] these suspicions.”242
Black continued his explanation, writing that the “British instigators” had at one point
been “former officers” in the British Army and had “surrendered at Yorktown in 1781,” thus,
according to Black, they developed a resentment for Americans and instigated “native agitators”
when it suited them.243 Black scoffed at the idea that this had been a larger conspiracy set forth
by the British government and specifically refuted the idea that the British had anything to do
with the rise in popularity the “nativist movement that centered on Tecumseh and, even more, his
brother, Tenskwatawa, the Prophet.”244 Black argued that the most concrete proof that Native
American relations had nothing to do with the declaration of war resided in Madison’s war
message to Congress, in which he made “no reference to problems with Native Americans in his
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case for preparedness.”245 Black instead argued that the increase in Native American tensions
was a natural consequence, a direct cause of American expansion. Black also noted that rather
than a “cause of the War of 1812,” Native American tensions was more of a “background” to the
war.246
Concluding his explanation of the cause of the War of 1812, Black introduced a final
theory that seemed to explain the cause of the war. He wrote “aside from the specific issues in
dispute…there was a more general sense, particularly among the Jeffersonians, that the
Revolution was unfinished because Britain remained powerful; and that this power threatened
American interests and public morality as Britain was corrosive but seductive model of unAmerican activity.” 247 Black had decided that moniker of “Revolutionary War II” fit the War of
1812 nicely, explaining that it was simply a result of so much unfinished business.
In Paul A. Gilje’s 2010 article “Free Trade and Sailors' Rights: The Rhetoric of the War
of 1812,” the author also examined the causes of the War of 1812. In this article, Gilje asserted
that the answer to “what caused the war” was easily found in a popular saying that existed
amongst American sailors at the time: “free trade and sailors’ rights.”248 Gilje argued that the
slogan was embraced “by common people” and that its “resonance” was due to the fact that the
chant was reminiscent of ideals that had “represented important aspects of Revolutionary
heritage.”249 While illustrating the popularity of the slogan amongst the sailors that emblazoned

245

Ibid.
Ibid.
247
Ibid, p.43.
248
Paul A. Gilje, “‘Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights’: The Rhetoric of the War of 1812,” Journal of the Early Republic
30, no. 1 (2010), p.1.
249
Ibid, p.3.
246

55

it on their flags, Gilje also explained that the embargo and non-intercourse act all issued before
the “outbreak of war” all sought the same result “the desire for free trade.”250
As for the “sailors’ rights” part of the chant, Gilje explained that while this statement had
obvious “revolutionary implications,” it also served as “a low culture message meant to rile
aristocrat[ic]” British Navy officers who had been charged with the tasks of searching American
ships.251 Gilje continued arguing his point by providing James Madison’s war message, in which
the President claimed that “thousands of American citizens under the safeguard of public law and
of their national flag have been torn from their country, and from everything dear to them.”252
To Gilje, this was irrefutable proof that Madison was finally admitting something must be done
to guarantee government protection for sailors.
Gilje also provided a quote from one of Henry Clay’s speeches in 1813 to support his
sailors’ rights argument. Gilje wrote that Clay declared “if we fail, let us fail like men, lash
ourselves to our gallant tars, and expire together in one common struggle, fighting for ‘Seamen’s
rights and free trade.”253 To Gilje this again proved how dedicated Washington was to their
commitment to Sailors and trade, cementing the idea that this had been the main driver to declare
war. While a short article, Gilje provided a unique and interesting perspective that attempted to
take a “history from the bottom up” approach to determining what may have been the cause of
the war.
Gilje continued his study on the War of 1812 for the next few years, and in 2013 he
published his book Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights in the War of 1812. In the introduction of his
text, the reader quickly learns that Gilje has almost completely changed his opinion on what had
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been the cause of the war. The author explained “the origins of the war were complex and
entailed more than the slogan free trade and sailors’ rights waving from Porter's masthead.”254
Continuing, Gilje wrote that he had changed views and had now seen what some other historians
had explained almost a century ago. Gilje had concluded that there was some merit to the
“expansionist” theories put forth by Julius Pratt. He noted “in many ways the roots of the war
lay in assorted expansionism that coveted not only Canada to the north and Florida (which
belonged to neutral Spain) to the south, but also the Native American lands in between.”255
Interestingly Gilje also argued for the support of yet another cause of the war, American
Nationalism. He wrote “for large numbers of Americans, the war also had to be fought to sustain
the honor of the Republic that was being tested by an aggressive, arrogant and oppressive Great
Britain (and maybe France).”256 While some historians had argued that the Americans needed to
fight for the survival of their nation, Gilje wrote that the “honor” of the new nation was
significantly important as well.257
Gilje wrote that he soon saw a pattern emerge when attempting to try and pinpoint an
exact cause for the war. The author argued that all of these causes had been influenced by
Enlightenment ideals. Attempting to present his theory, he explained “The Enlightenment
challenged the way most nations did their diplomatic business in the 18th century. Central to this
challenge was the ideology of free trade.”258 Gilje, however, failed to completely develop this
idea. The author does however provide future historians with an interesting point of future
research.
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While Gilje was able to provide several examples to support various theories on the
causes of the war, he still wanted to impress upon his readers the importance of Porter’s slogan,
especially among the average American citizen at the time. Seemingly somewhat perplexed,
Gilje concluded, “whatever the origins of the conflict, the rhetoric during the war emphasized the
ideals encapsulated in Porter’s motto.”259 Gilje’s evolving theory in his text examined many
different theories that emerged over the past two centuries that all could have contributed to the
cause of the war, but also echoed the important role “national honor” played.
In an effort to sort the confusion surrounding the cause of the war, Gilje wrote that he
wanted to examine the situation as a whole and even for historians to acknowledge that the
“confusion” around the war had all been an intended. The author claimed that it was a wider
conspiracy, part of a larger “political game” that was being played. Gilje argued “Republicans
began to mold the memory of the War of 1812 as soon as the conflict ended” in an attempt to
avoid political upheaval for their party.260 Gilje explained that the Republicans suffered a drastic
political hit because of “the often pathetic performance of the military, the political paralysis that
contributed to one disaster after another, and a peace treaty that settled none of the reputed
causes of the war.”261
While Gilje concluded that the Republicans were for the most part successful in
obscuring their “pathetic performance” he also noted that “Federalists were outraged by this
approach and correctly pointed out that the Treaty of Ghent ignored Porter's motto.”262 A point
that the author admits the Federalists failed to fully capitalize on. Ending his work, Gilje wanted
to emphasize the complete failure of the war, again showing exactly why he believed the
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Republicans did all that they could to obscure as many details as possible about the war,
including details about the cause. He concluded “issues of impressment and sailors’ rights were
never settled; the issues simply became irrelevant after Great Britain and France ended their
war.”263
Noah Feldman’s 2017 biography of James Madison entitled, The Three Lives of James
Madison, Genius, Partisan, President, sought to provide a fully detailed account of James
Madison’s political career, starting with the years just before the Revolutionary War. Feldman, a
constitutional law expert who has had the “pleasure” of testifying before Congress concerning
the founding fathers, wrote that he wanted to show the world the intellectual side of Madison.
Feldman argued that Madison’s innate intellectual ability is what allowed him to “shape ideas
that could be expressed through precise, reasoned argument,” which Feldman argued, is how
Madison was able to “devise the Constitution” as well as the Bill of Rights.264 Feldman’s text
contained a wealth of primary sources, seemingly leaving no stone unturned and providing
readers with an extremely detailed picture of Madison. Feldman’s work offered valuable insight
into how Madison arrived at certain decisions, using excerpts from Madison’s letters and diary
entries in order justify his conclusions.
While Feldman’s work did not intentionally set out to examine and explain the cause(s)
of the War of 1812, his study of Madison’s political choices shed some light on the situation.
Feldman divided his text into three smaller “books” with the third and final book being mostly
devoted to the War of 1812. Here, Feldman wrote that he wanted to look at the embargo
President Jefferson enacted, as well as the fallout from its abject failure. Feldman did remind his
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readers that importantly, Madison, not Jefferson, had been the “brains” behind the embargo, a
fact that would later prove important in Feldman’s conclusion.
First, Feldman wrote that he sought to vindicate the theories Madison had on the
“possible impact” of an American embargo. Feldman used records to prove that, indeed “prices
skyrocketed exactly as predicted,” with a barrel of flour in the West Indies jumping from seven
dollars before the embargo, to nearly forty after.265 Feldman explained that this ultimately
caused a loss of about 50% of the needed supply of flour in the West Indies. Feldman then found
records that this trend continued with other exports such as American cotton, which “fell from a
high of forty million pounds in 1807, when importers were frantically trying to get stocks to
Europe in Advance of any sanctions, to just twelve million pounds in 1808.”266 Feldman also
provided the date that showed the embargo had caused a “jump in the price of cotton in
London.”267 Feldman concluded, “the embargo thus had an impact. The problem was that the
impact was not drastic enough to achieve the desired coercive effect quickly.”268 Feldman
effectively proved that had the American economy been able to sustain the impact, Madison’s
experiment could have proved very successful, and averted war. Unfortunately, this was not the
reality.
While “Britain’s export economy was more robust, immune to external shocks than
Madison had anticipated,” Feldman explained, the Americans were suffering as “the
consequences of the embargo were immediate and devastating.”269 While many American
citizens supported efforts aimed at causing harm to England, Feldman noted that “patriotic
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sentiment could not restrain merchants from trying to sell their wares abroad,” causing merchants
to seek out ways to get their goods to foreign markets illegally.270 Because merchants were
allowed to travel between American ports, Feldman argued the “simplest” way to “avoid” the
embargo “was therefore to stock a ship and pretend to sail for another U.S. port, then put out to
sea and head for the West Indies, British Canada or Europe,” which many merchants did.271
Feldman explained that at this time, the federal government lacked anyway to effectively
enforce their embargo. He noted that this changed six months into the embargo, when Gallatin
explained to Jefferson and Madison that in order to enforce the embargo effectively he would
“require both a rule that no ship could leave port at all without advance permission, and a little
army on the Canadian border to prevent smuggling.”272 Feldman continued, writing that Gallatin
also requested “to be able to give his officers the authority to seize goods arbitrarily on the basis
that they were intended for illegal export, without probable cause or warrant.”273 The irony that
Jefferson and Madison were prepared to cross their own citizens in ways similar to how the
British had, was not lost on Feldman. He declared that Jefferson and Madison’s “draconian
measures…had led the Republicans to a policy of massive coercive authority over American
citizens.”274
Feldman also made sure to note that while these measures seemed extreme, especially
when compared to the party ideals these men typically held, he argued that the men had
concluded any alternative to war was the better choice for the citizens of their young nation.275 A
war, they argued, would have far more of an impact than any measures they would be taking to
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enforce the embargo. Despite all efforts, Feldman explained that the embargo never succeeded
in its goals. Feldman wrote that Madison’s ability to recover from the embargo politically, and
to be elected President, was nothing short of a miracle. The author concluded that Madison’s
success had in fact been “buoyed by an atmosphere of enthusiasm for the end of a policy that he
had himself initiated.”276
Feldman wanted to emphasize to his readers that Madison’s intentions with the embargo
had always been pure. He explained that Madison had simply been so set in idea that his logic
was correct, and his embargo, “logically”, could not fail. When it did, the need to contain the
fallout was a matter of fighting for existence, Feldman noted.277 The author explained that
winning the Presidency had not been a selfish goal of Madison’s. Instead, Feldman argued that
Madison felt an obligation. He explained “he had not sought the presidency in fulfillment of the
psychological drives that have powered so many into the office, for good or for ill. He had run
because he believed he could successfully navigate the dangerous shoals of global war.”278
Feldman explained that Madison felt unfinished in his work of developing and designing the
nation, and that “his broader aim was to do for American foreign policy what he had done for
domestic governance through the Constitution: design, create, and implement a model that would
align republican liberty and the public interest.”279 As far as Feldman was concerned, this was a
major key in understanding the cause of the war. He noted that while Madison had good
intentions with his adherence to “certain principals… these principles could not resolve the
dilemma of being caught between Britain and France…. neither would permit American
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shipping” leaving Madison to return to square one in order to find a solution to his European
problem.280
Feldman explained that at this point, “Madison needed a new account of why war was
necessary.”281 He continued, arguing that producing an accessible, comprehensible explanation
for the war was especially important because, although Madison was now advocating bold
action, he had reached this conclusion only after years of exhausting every possibility of peace,”
and as a result the American economy had taken a huge hit.282 Feldman concluded that
Madison’s solution was “crafting a narrative that could be understood and adopted by the
public,” arguing that “his experience in founding the Republican party had taught him the
importance” of such a “skill.”283 It is because of these reasons that Feldman believed there was
so much confusion surrounding what had caused the War of 1812.
Feldman continued his accusations against Madison, writing “the key to his success was
changing the meaning of the war as it was fought, depicting it as a second war of independence
to establish national sovereignty on the seas. Reframing the narrative transformed the result into
a victory.”284 Feldman argued that Madison knew exactly what was at stake, as he “had gambled
his political legacy on war,” causing the President to “begin his story with impressment,” the
author charged.285 Despite the many setbacks, Feldman concluded that Madison “triumphed
despite failing to achieve his original goals.”286 Listing his successes, the author concluded
“Madison’s presidential legacy was now assured. He had striven to avoid war, and his economic

280

Ibid, p.504.
Ibid, p.543.
282
Ibid, p.543.
283
Ibid.
284
Ibid, p.609.
285
Ibid.
286
Ibid.
281

63

sanctions proved in retrospect that he had embraced force only when it was unavoidable… and in
the process, he had cemented the dominance of the Republican Party, which aspired- according
to Madison’s constitutional vision- to end partisanship altogether.”287
Feldman also discussed other possible causes of the war, such as Native American
relations. He explained that while “Americans wanted conquest for expansion” they were left
with “no peaceful means readily available to improve border relations” as the “Indian tribes
wanted to keep the land on which they lived.”288 The author concluded, as Black recently did,
that the increasing tensions with Native Americans had more to do with American expansion,
and less to with nefarious actions by British military officers.289 If anyone was to be blamed for
increasing tensions, Feldman concluded it would have to be the person who encouraged
Americans to move westward after purchasing a large among of land. Feldman, of course, was
referencing Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase that had been completed several years earlier.290
In his text, Feldman also took a moment to address the work of historian Henry Adams in
his History of the United States of America 1801- 1817. Feldman wrote that Adams’
interpretation was flawed, with the historian interpreting “Madison’s…policies as the adoption of
the Federalist program associated with his great-grandfather John Adams.”291 Instead, Feldman
argued that Adams “overstated” the case for his grandfather, reminding his reader that this biased
piece was what heavily influenced the historiography concerning topics involving the War of
1812 for decades.292 Feldman concluded that the evidence was clear, Madison had “muddied”
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the cause of the war of 1812 on purpose, not only to save his career, but also in order to preserve
the union.
In 2015 Richard Maass published his article “Difficult to Relinquish Territory Which
Had Been Conquered”: Expansionism and the War of 1812.” In this article, the author revisited
“expansionism” causes of the war that had been popularized by Julius Pratt in the 1940s. Maass
sought to explain how that explanation had gained traction and concluded that historians in that
camp had likened the events to recent wars. He wrote “it was not a premeditated land grab akin
to the 1939 German invasion of Poland.”293 Maass explained “it was not even a war that
President James Madison wanted to fight. In fact, both the Madison administration and the
majority of Congress opposed the annexation of Canada.”294
In an attempt to explain why Pratt may have been misguided, Maass explained that the
theory may have been given more merit than it deserved as “visions of acquiring Canadian land
inflamed public opinion in the northwest territories and hand handful of congressmen.”295
However, Maass noted that “the majority of US leaders firmly opposed annexation.”296 Maass
explained that rather than a land grab, the war of 1812 it was a diplomatic bluff of continental
proportions.”297 Maas argued that clearly, “the war was a desperate act on the part of US leaders
brought to their wits end by British maritime restrictions, which were themselves desperate acts
by a British government fighting for its life against Napoleon.”298 Maass wrote that “after six
years of failed US attempts at commercial coercion, war was seen as the only lever remaining by
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which the United states might free itself from those maritime restrictions, which had combined
with the ill-advised US commercial retaliations to devastate the American economy.”299 Again,
a pattern emerges where historians paint Madison as both the cause of the war, and the nation’s
only hope.
Maass then attempted to then explain the other side of the expansionist argument,
discussing the many ways in which the United States had shown it had no interest in acquiring
Canada. Maass explained that while “U.S. leaders wanted Canada during the revolution…by
1812 the United States had changed. The constitution gave various states a measure of influence
over each other's domestic affairs through the federal government, heightening tensions among
conflicting interests.”300 Many feared “the anticipated effect of a territorial acquisition on the
domestic balance of power,” causing it to become “a key factor in calculating the desirability of
expansion not only with the annexation of Canada.”301 Specifically, Maass noted that many in
Congress feared the annexation “would spark a dissolution of the union.”302 The author also
explained that relatively “few Americans were eager to re assimilate Canada’s British loyalists,”
as rampant Anglophobia persisted. Maass also noted the “problems” with assimilating the
French Canadians as it was “feared” that the “French population’s… Catholicism and
monarchism might contaminate American society.”303 As far as Maass was concerned, the
answers as to what caused the war were easily explained when assessing Madison’s actions.
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Conclusion
When describing the war, historian and (then) soon to President Theodore Roosevelt
concluded that “the grounds of the war were singularly uncertain.”304 While it has been over a
century since Roosevelt declared his stance, one must ask if historians have answered the
seemingly unending question about why exactly the war was fought.
While it appears that almost every angle has been assessed, most historians tend to be
agreement that “maritime grievances” was the main drive behind the decision to declare war.
Native American relations, and the desire to expand the nation may have been extremely
important issues at the time, but many historians seem to conclude that without the conflicts
involving free trade and impressment, treaties could have been effective in realizing these other
goals.
As the historiography on the topic continues to grow, it appears that those assessing the
situation in the early twenty first century have decided to target James Madison. While they
bring up many interesting points, these historians have proven that while not intentional
Madison’s actions that resulted in war could have caused the nation to fail shortly after it started.
However, one important conclusion several have made is that Madison never intended to go to
war. In fact, they concluded that he attempted to avoid war in any way he believed possible. As
Noah Feldman wrote, “[Madison] had not sought the presidency in fulfillment of the
psychological drives that have powered so many into the office, for good or for ill. He had run
because he believed he could successfully navigate the dangerous shoals of global war.”305 This
also explains why the history of the war seems so confusing, as Feldman noted, Madison
believed it had to be in order to preserve the nation. The War of 1812 had not been declared on a
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whim; every single option available had been exhausted until Madison felt he could no longer
take any other action that would force the belligerent European nations to respect American ships
on the sea.
When discussing the future of the topic, a quote from historian Clifford Egan comes to
mind. He wrote “one truism is that every generation needs to rewrite the past.”306 With attention
firmly placed on Madison it will be interesting to see where historians in the twenty first century
will go. Perhaps with such a solid understanding of what exactly caused the war, historians can
now answer Reginald Horsman’s call to focus more attention on how the ever-changing
maritime laws effected average Americans at this time.307
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